Can I Stick to My Guns? Motivated Reasoning and Biased Processing of Balanced Political Information by Brenes-Peralta, C. (Carlos) et al.
 
ISSN 2386-7876 – © 2021 Communication & Society, 34(2), 49-66 
49
Can I Stick to My Guns? Motivated 
Reasoning and Biased Processing 
of Balanced Political Information 
 
Abstract 
News media offer balanced political messages and many citizens 
also seek content that presents two sides of a political issue. 
Despite this supply and demand, most work on information 
processing tests exposure to one-sided content, i.e., either pro- or 
counter-attitudinal. We advance this work by studying (1) how 
balanced and one-sided messages affect information processing; 
(2) whether the processing of balanced information is moderated 
by individual motivations; and (3) the impact of balanced exposure 
on attitude polarization. Using an online experiment (N = 677), we 
primed either accuracy or defensive motivation and examined 
how participants processed information about two distinct issues 
(i.e., climate change and Syrian refugees). On both issues, 
participants were less biased in response to balanced content, 
compared to one-sided content. In addition, defensive and 
accuracy motivated people processed balanced content in a 
similar manner. Furthermore, pro-attitudinal content polarized 
individual attitudes, but not balanced content, and this effect was 
not moderated by motivation. 
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1. Introduction 
The current media environment offers unprecedented content about 
politics and public affairs. Studying individual choices, their effects on 
information processing, and various attitudinal outcomes, political 
communication scholars have mostly focused on one-sided political 
content, pro- or counter-attitudinal (e.g., Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013; 
Garret & Stroud, 2014). That work has shown that people prefer pro- over 
counter-attitudinal content (e.g., Taber & Lodge, 2006), that they 
uncritically accept pro-attitudinal arguments and refute counter-attitudinal ones (e.g., 
Druckman & Bolsen, 2011), and that this biased information processing is the main reason 
why people’s attitudes become more extreme after exposure to either pro- or counter-
attitudinal content (e.g., Garret & Stroud, 2014). 
In this paper, we shift this dominant focus away from pro- and counter-attitudinal 
messages and toward exposure to balanced media messages, those that present both pro- and 
counter-attitudinal arguments side by side. Examining balanced news content is crucial 
because –despite that partisan news have become more available (van Aelst et al., 2017)– 
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2014; see also All Sides Media Bias Ratings, 2020). In addition to this “supply side,” growing 
evidence shows high demand for balanced news and political content (e.g., Reuters Digital 
News Report, 2020). 
Despite the continued supply and the popularity of balanced news, evidence on how 
people interpret and react to such news is limited and inconsistent. Compared to one-sided 
information, some work has suggested that people respond to balanced information more 
open-mindedly (e.g., Metzger, Hartsell & Flanagin, 2020), which could reduce attitude 
polarization (e.g., Sunstein, 2009). However, other studies have indicated that individuals 
interpret balanced content in the same biased fashion as one-sided messages, which could 
exacerbate attitude polarization (see Arceneaux & Johnson, 2015). 
One possible explanation for these inconsistencies is that these effects are contingent on 
individual motivations to process political content. Motivated reasoning theory posits that 
people driven by defensive motivation process information in biased ways to reinforce their 
priors, whereas individuals motivated by accuracy are more objective because they seek a 
correct conclusion (Kunda, 1990). We integrate and extend this work by studying whether 
defensive and accuracy motivations shape individual processing of balanced political 
information, compared to one-sided information and –in addition– whether the relationship 
between balanced exposure and attitude polarization depends on these motivations. 
We use data from an online experiment on a Mechanical Turk sample of Americans. First, 
we randomly assigned participants to a control group or one of two motivation conditions: 
defensive or accuracy, and later to three message exposure conditions: pro- attitudinal, 
counter-attitudinal or balanced. Then, we collected data on how participants processed 
messages about two political issues, refugees and climate change, and –lastly– measured 
attitude polarization. 
2. Balanced news in the media environment 
Although traditionally, political communication research has focused on how people seek and 
react to one-sided political news –those that support or oppose an individual´s attitudes 
towards political issues– we argue that scholars should give equal attention to balanced news 
content, which is not only continually supplied by news media organizations but also 
frequently demanded by many citizens. 
Despite partisan news has become more available over time (van Aelst et al., 2017) –
numerous news media across several countries provide balanced reporting (Prior, 2013; 
Umbricht & Esser, 2014; All Sides Media Bias Ratings, 2020). Also, algorithmic online news 
recommendations offer users diverse information –as is characteristic of balanced news 
(Moller, Trilling, Helberger & van Es, 2018). 
This supply of balanced news coverage is complemented by a strong demand for 
balanced news among news audiences. Extant research has shown that most Americans visit 
news websites from across the political spectrum (Flaxman, Goel & Rao, 2016), that many 
users select balanced news as frequently as pro-attitudinal news (e.g., Brenes Peralta, 
Wojcieszak, Lelkes & de Vreese, 2017; for review see Wojcieszak, Winter & Yu, 2020). Surveys 
further have showed that the majority of news consumers in Europe, the U.S., and several 
other nations show strong interest in public-service television (see Reuters Digital News 
Report, 2020), which prioritize balanced news coverage (van Aelst et al., 2017). 
3. Biased processing of political arguments 
Numerous studies have demonstrated that people process one-sided political messages (i.e., 
pro- or counter-attitudinal) in a biased manner. Specifically, individuals exhibit two types of 
cognitive biases: attitude congruency bias, such that congenial messages are evaluated as 
stronger than attitude-discrepant messages, and disconfirmation bias, such that people spend 
cognitive resources bolstering pro-attitudinal messages and denigrating counter-attitudinal 
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ones (e.g., Heiss, von Sikorski & Matthes, 2019; Taber et al., 2009). It is not clear, however, 
whether these well-established biases also emerge when people process balanced messages. 
Evidence on the subject is limited and inconsistent. One perspective has suggested that 
people do not perceive balanced messages as neutral, but instead treat them as either 
supporting or opposing their prior views (e.g., Druckman & Bolsen, 2011). As a result, balanced 
content is processed in the same biased manner as one-sided messages (e.g., Arceneaux & 
Johnson, 2015), with people perceiving pro-attitudinal arguments in balanced messages as 
stronger than counter-attitudinal arguments and uncritically accepting the former while 
dismissing the later (Taber et al., 2009). This perspective is reflected in the well-documented 
hostile media effect (e.g., Gunther, 2017). 
However, an alternative perspective has indicated that attitude congruency and 
disconfirmation biases should be weaker in response to balanced compared to one-sided 
messages. For instance, research on attitude congruency bias has shown that individuals 
grant little credibility to counter-attitudinal messages, but they perceive balanced 
information as more credible than pro-attitudinal messages (Metzger et al., 2020), possibly 
because people see a balanced message as objective and useful –as it provides diverse 
perspectives. 
Additional research has argued that disconfirmation bias should also be weaker in 
response to balanced exposure. Although people generally accept pro-attitudinal arguments, 
this tendency is stronger if information is one-sided, but weaker if a message also contains a 
competing perspective –as is typical in balanced messages (e.g., Lodge & Taber, 2000). Also, 
individuals are less likely to refute counter-attitudinal views in balanced, compared to one-
sided messages. This may be because individuals must generate their own counter-arguments 
in response to counter-attitudinal messages, but not to balanced messages, as the latter 
already include arguments that refute the opposing side (see Lodge & Taber, 2000). Overall 
people should be less likely to have supporting thoughts about pro-attitudinal arguments and 
to dismiss counter-attitudinal arguments, when both views are embedded in a balanced 
message. Given the mixed evidence in the literature, we examine the following research 
question: 
RQ1. How does exposure to balanced messages affect biased information processing 
(attitude congruency and disconfirmation biases), compared to one-sided message 
exposure? 
In addition to our research question, it is possible that some individuals are more biased 
in response to balanced information, while others are more open-minded. In other words, we 
argue that different motivations shape people’s reactions to balanced versus one-sided 
messages. 
4. Motivated reasoning and balanced information processing 
Historically, theories such as cognitive dissonance (see Festinger, 1957) and self-
reinforcement (e.g., Luthans & Stajovic, 1999) have argued that individuals prefer pro-
attitudinal information to reinforce their opinions, and do not attend to information that 
challenges their prior beliefs. However, both theories do not explain why citizens 
intentionally seek diverse information diets and how they react to and are affected by them. 
Motivated reasoning theory, which has been considered a central theory to study the diverse 
motivations driving the selection and processing of political information, especially in the 
context of high-choice media environments, attends to these gaps (e.g., Druckman, 2012; 
Winter, Metzger & Flanagin, 2016). 
Motivated reasoning theory posits that motivations determine the cognitive strategies 
people use to process information (Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla & Chen, 1996; Kunda, 1990). 
Motivation is defined as “as any wish, desire, or preference to achieve desired outcomes” 
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(Kunda, 1990, p. 480), and human reasoning is said to rely on two major motivations that guide 
information processing: a defensive motivation and an accuracy motivation. 
A defensive motivation drives people to use cognitive strategies that help them reinforce 
and protect their existing beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors (Kunda, 1990). Extensive research 
has shown that attitude congruency and disconfirmation biases are the prevailing strategies 
used by defensive motivated people to process one-sided information about politics (e.g., 
Bolsen, Druckman & Cook, 2014; Taber & Lodge, 2006). 
In contrast, accuracy motivated individuals use cognitive strategies that are optimal to 
reach a correct conclusion about a certain issue (Kunda, 1990). These individuals are less likely 
to rely on attitude congruency and disconfirmation biases to process political messages 
(Bolsen et al., 2014; Druckman, 2012). Instead, they process information in a more open-
minded and unbiased fashion, regardless of whether or not this information is pro-attitudinal 
(Kunda, 1990). 
Conceptually, we view defensive and accuracy motivations as two ends of a continuum 
because of two reasons. First, drawing on most theories of motivation, one perspective would 
suggest that defensive and accuracy motivations are part of an underlying continuum, as they 
both serve higher-order motivations (see Hart, Shaver & Goldberg, 2005). Second, individuals 
are incapable of pursuing conflicting motivations in the same context –they either protect 
desired conclusions or reach accurate conclusions. Instead, the strength of defensive and 
accuracy motivations will vary across individuals (Lodge & Taber, 2000) and situations 
(Leeper & Slothuus, 2014). This perspective suggests that the strength of each motivation 
determines whether an individual in a certain context is situated in one or the other end of 
the motivation continuum, or if both motivations are strong, individuals must compromise 
between their wish to reach a desired conclusion and the plausibility of that conclusion being 
true (see Kunda, 1990). 
To the best of our knowledge, no extant work has shown how defensive and accuracy 
motivated individuals respond to the same balanced messages. Nevertheless, previous 
research provides some insights to expect that individual motivation may influence how 
balanced information is processed. Specifically, we expect individual motivation (i.e., 
defensive or accuracy) to moderate the effect of the type of information exposure (i.e., 
balanced, pro- or counter-attitudinal) on the two mechanisms of biased processing (i.e., 
attitude congruency bias and disconfirmation bias). 
With respect to attitude congruency bias, we argue that a desire among defensive 
motivated people to reinforce their priors should strongly color their evaluations of balanced 
messages, and as such, these messages should be processed in the same biased fashion as 
one-sided information. We propose then that a defensive motivation will drive people to judge 
balanced and counter-attitudinal messages as weaker, compared to pro-attitudinal messages. 
On the contrary, we expect accuracy motivated individuals to evaluate the strength of a 
message based on whether it offers an opportunity to reach a correct conclusion about a 
certain issue. As such, accuracy motivated people should judge balanced messages as 
stronger, relative to pro and counter-attitudinal messages. 
Therefore, we expect that: 
H1a. Defensive motivated people will exhibit stronger attitude congruency bias, such that 
they will evaluate pro-attitudinal messages as stronger than balanced and counter-
attitudinal messages (Hypothesis 1a). 
H1b. Accuracy motivated people will exhibit weaker attitude congruency bias, such that 
they will evaluate balanced messages as stronger than pro- and counter-attitudinal 
messages (i.e., weaker attitude congruency bias) (Hypothesis 1b). 
With respect to the second mechanism of biased reasoning, disconfirmation bias, we 
argue that defensive motivated people will bolster attitude-reinforcing opinions and 
denigrate counter-attitudinal arguments when exposed to both one-sided and balanced 
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messages. Conversely, we expect accuracy motivated individuals to be more open-minded 
and objective when they must weigh evidence in support and against a certain issue, 
compared to when the evidence is one-sided. We thus predict that: 
H2a. Defensive motivated people will exhibit stronger disconfirmation bias, such that 
they will be equally likely to bolster pro-attitudinal arguments and denigrate 
counter-attitudinal arguments in a one-sided message (i.e., pro- or counter-
attitudinal), as in balanced messages (Hypothesis 2a). 
H2b. Accuracy motivated individuals will exhibit weaker disconfirmation bias, such that 
they will be less likely to bolster pro-attitudinal arguments and to denigrate 
counter-attitudinal arguments in balanced messages, compared to one-sided 
messages (Hypothesis 2b). 
5. Balanced exposure and Polarization 
Next, we examine how the motivated selection of balanced messages influences attitude 
polarization, a socially consequential outcome of information exposure. When it comes to 
one-sided content, extensive research suggests that exposure to pro-attitudinal and counter-
attitudinal messages can polarize citizens (e.g., Garret & Stroud, 2014), especially those who 
already hold extreme political views (Levendusky, 2013). Conversely, other research has 
shown that counter-attitudinal exposure in social media promotes more moderate views (see 
Beam, Hutchens & Hmielowski, 2018). 
Although exposure to balanced content is seen as a remedy to polarization, in that it 
could promote mutual understanding between citizens on divisive issues (e.g., Slater, 2007), 
evidence on its depolarizing effects is inconsistent. Some studies have shown that exposure 
to political messages can polarize attitudes, regardless of whether people are exposed to one-
sided or balanced messages (e.g., Arceneaux & Johnson, 2015); other research has suggested 
that balanced exposure may constrain polarization, more so than one-sided messages 
(Levendusky, 2013). 
We argue that the extent to which information exposure leads to polarization depends 
on the interaction between message slant and motivated reasoning, in that people’s reactions 
to balanced messages are influenced by their motivations. On the one hand, we expect that 
defensive motivated people will polarize in response to balanced exposure because these 
individuals will process these messages in biased fashion. 
H3a. Defensive motivated people will be equally likely to polarize in reaction to balanced 
messages, compared to one-sided messages (Hypothesis 3a). 
On the other hand, if individuals succeed in prioritizing accuracy over the validation of 
their prior opinions, they are more likely to consider diverse perspectives in an objective and 
open-minded manner, and therefore, polarization could be constrained. 
H3b. Accuracy motivated people will be less likely to polarize in reaction to balanced or 
counter-attitudinal messages, compared to pro-attitudinal messages (Hypothesis 
3b). 
6. Method 
6.1. Study Design 
To examine our research question and hypotheses, we conducted an online experiment with 
a 3 between-subjects (control, defensive motivation, accuracy motivation) x 3 between-
subjects (pro-attitudinal, counter-attitudinal, or balanced messages) x 2 within-subjects 
(climate change, Syrian refugees) design that examined participants’ information processing 
and attitude polarization. To guard against the possibility that our results are due to 
idiosyncrasies of a single socio-political topic, we chose two distinct issues that were salient 
at the time of the project (May 2016): climate change, a scientific and complex issue, and 
admitting Syrian refugees to the U.S., an issue that is more affective and can be interpreted at 
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the “gut” level. We used the same stimuli for the climate change issue as we did in our prior 
work to study the selection of balanced content (Brenes Peralta et. al., 2017). 
6.2. Participants 
We recruited a sample of U.S. participants via Amazon Mechanical Turk. Initially, 1020 
participants gave their consent to be part of the experiment. Then, only MTurkers who 
expressed attitudes in support or against toward the two issues participated in the 
experiment (i.e., by design we excluded 331 participants without a directional attitude on both 
issues). Next, we excluded 12 participants from the experiment because they failed a question 
that measured whether they paid attention to instructions. Thus, our final sample consisted 
of 677 participants. The sample was 55% female and 45% male, with an average age of 36.5 years 
(SD = 11.84). Across education attainment, 9% had a high school degree or less, 24% some 
college but no degree, 14% an Associate degree, 37% a Bachelor’s degree, 12% a Master’s degree, 
and 4% a Doctorate or professional degree1. 
6.3. Manipulations motivated reasoning 
To manipulate accuracy motivation, we developed a priming text based on prior experiments 
(e.g., Druckman, 2012). In turn, to prime defensive motivation, we designed our own text given 
that this motivation is rarely manipulated in extant studies. Furthermore, unlike most prior 
work, we included a control group in which neither defensive nor accuracy motivations were 
primed. This was necessary to discern whether primed motivations were different from the 
motivational baseline that control participants pursued in the experimental situation (i.e., to 
address the contention that people are naturally driven by defensive goals, see Taber & Lodge, 
2006). 
Participants in the control condition read only the following text: 
In this section, we will ask you to read a set of arguments about (Syrian refugees coming 
to the U.S. or climate change) and you will tell us how WEAK or STRONG you believe each 
argument is. 
In addition to the control text, participants in defensive goal condition were told: 
Imagine you will be participating in a debate that will decide whether or not to approve a 
policy about admitting Syrian refugees into the country / climate change. When rating 
each argument, consider how useful this argument would be to defend your own position 
on the issue. As a reminder, you said you (supported/opposed the issue in the pre-
questionnaire). Think that you would like to win the debate and the arguments should 
help you make the best case for your own position. 
Those in the accuracy condition read the following text: 
Imagine you will be participating in a debate as an unbiased judge that will decide whether 
or not to approve a policy about (admitting Syrian refugees or climate change). When 
rating each argument, consider how useful it would be to come to an objective decision. 
It is important that the decision carefully consider all sides in a neutral way. Think that 
you would like to thoroughly understand the policy and the arguments should help you 
come to an evenhanded decision. 
6.4. Manipulation Checks 
In general, most studies on motivated reasoning do not have or do not report manipulation 
checks. We developed four self-report items as manipulation checks of motivation for 
 
1 Compared with the data of the U.S. Census Bureau (2010a, 2010b), our sample is similar in terms of gender and age. 
However, our sample was more educated than the general population. We computed a weighting variable that we 
used in all analyses to conform to the distribution of education in the U.S. population. The results of all analyses were 
the same as those of the unweighted original sample. 
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information processing on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree), which were 
presented in a random order: “When I was rating these arguments, I was able to set aside my own 
prior beliefs,” “I was able to be objective,” “I was able to be evenhanded” and “I was thinking about 
my own opinion” (reverse coded). An exploratory factor analysis with a maximum likelihood 
extraction loaded the four items in a single factor, with an eigenvalue of 2.6 and explaining 
65.3% of the variance. The resulting manipulation check index had good reliability (Cronbach’s 
Alpha = .84). Based on our conceptual view of defensive and accuracy motivation as two ends 
of a motivation continuum, higher scores in the manipulation check indicate movement in 
the continuum towards an accuracy motivation, whereas lower scores indicate movement 
towards a defensive motivation. 
A one-way ANOVA showed a significant effect of the motivation factor on the 
manipulation check for the three motivation conditions, F (2, 674) = 22.57, p < .001, η2 = .04. Post-
hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for the accuracy 
motivation condition (M = 4.59, SD = 1.22) was significantly higher than the control (M = 4.25, 
SD = .88; ∆M = .34, p < .01) and defensive motivation conditions (M = 4.03, SD = 1.28; ∆M = .56, 
p < .001). In addition, control participants scored significantly higher that the defensive 
motivated (∆M = .22, p < .05). In short, our manipulations were effective. 
6.5. Stimulus material 
Relying on factual information from existing news articles and issue-specific websites, we 
developed 18 short messages about climate change and Syrian refugees coming to the U.S. The 
messages were directly comparable in terms of length (between 75 and 86 words). For each 
issue, some messages supported the issue (pro-issue messages), some opposed the issue (con-
issue messages), and some presented both pro- and con-issue arguments in an even-handed 
manner (balanced messages). 
Each pro and con-issue message contained a lead statement that expressed support or 
opposition –for example in relation to a U.S. plan to mitigate carbon emissions– followed by 
three arguments supported by numerical evidence. The lead statement in balanced messages 
mentioned that some people agree and others disagree with the issue. Then it presented the 
same pro and con-issue arguments from the one-sided messages. The order of the pro- and 
con-issue arguments was counter-balanced in the balanced messages. This means that in 
some balanced messages, pro-issue arguments were mentioned first and con-issue 
arguments second, whereas this order was reversed in other balanced messages. 
In our past work (Brenes Peralta et al., 2017), we pretested the climate change messages 
on an independent sample of 711 U.S participants via MTurk, to ensure the messages were 
perceived as intended (i.e., balanced, pro- or con-issue)2. We developed the messages about 
admitting Syrian refugees to the U.S. to mirror the structure of the climate change messages 
and –given the direct parallels between the messages on the two issues– did not pilot the 
refugees’ messages. 
6.6. Procedure 
First, a pre-test questionnaire measured participants’ attitudes about climate change 
mitigation policy and Syrian refugees coming to the U.S., as well as the demographic 
characteristics. The pre-test also included an attention check question, telling participants 
they would be presented with a list of emotions to report how they felt, but then instructing 
 
2 ANOVA results from the pretest showed that the message types only differed on the manipulations of the issue 
stance, F(6, 704) = 2114.40, p < .001. Pro-issue messages were rated more as having supporting arguments, compared to 
balanced and con-issue messages. Con-issue messages were perceived more as having opposing arguments, and 
balanced messages were perceived more as containing both pro- and con-issue arguments (all p < .001). Additionally, 
all the messages were perceived as equally interesting, understandable, convincing, believable and coherent (all p > 
.05). 
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them to select the option “none of the emotions above.” Second, participants were randomly 
assigned to one of three motivated reasoning conditions: control, defensive motivation, or 
accuracy motivation. Third, within each motivation condition, participants were randomly 
assigned to one of three message exposure conditions: 1) three pro-attitudinal, 2) three 
counter-attitudinal or 3) three balanced. We chose three messages per condition to obtain 
more precise measurements and also to assure that the effects are not due to any particular 
message alone. If participants were exposed to either pro- or counter-attitudinal messages, 
the message they read depended on their previously reported issues attitudes (whether pro- 
or anti-issue; for instance, a pro-refugee participant in the pro-attitudinal message condition 
read a message supportive of refugees). Within each message condition, participants read 
three messages about climate change and three about refugees (six messages in total; either 
balanced, pro- or counter-attitudinal). We randomized the order of issue exposure, which 
means that participants were randomly exposed to climate change messages, followed by 
messages about refugees, or vice versa. Immediately after reading each message, participants 
rated the strength of its argument and listed their thoughts. Finally, participants again 
reported their attitudes about both issues and answered the manipulation check items. 
6.7. Measures 
6.7.1. Climate change attitudes 
Participants reported how strongly they opposed or supported a U.S. governmental policy 
that mitigates climate change by reducing carbon emissions on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly 
oppose, 7 = strongly support; M = 5.63, SD = 1.6). 
6.7.2. Refugees attitudes 
Participants reported how strongly they opposed or supported that Syrian refugees came to 
the U.S., on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly oppose, 7 = strongly support; M = 4.39, SD = 2.06). 
6.7.3. Biased processing 
We operationalized biased information processing as done in prior research (see Taber et al., 
2009). First, we used an argument-rating task to test attitude congruency bias. After reading a 
message, participants reported how strong they believed the argument was on a 7-point scale 
(1 = not at all strong 7 = very strong). Mean scores for climate change messages were 4.47 (SD = 
1.45) and 4.52 (SD = 1.60) for messages about refugees. Second, we used a thought-listing task 
to test disconfirmation bias. Participants listed up to five thoughts strictly about each message 
they read –up to 15 thoughts for a set of three messages. On average, participants reported 
7.16 thoughts (SD = 4.35) about climate change and 7.8 about refugees (SD = 4.39). The content 
of all listed thoughts was coded by three trained coders (Krippendorff’s Alpha = 0.75). For pro- 
and counter-attitudinal messages, each thought was coded for whether it opposed the 
argument in the message (e.g., I do not want refugees here; in a pro-refugee message) or 
supported the argument (e.g., I agree they pose a threat to the country; in a con-refugee 
message). Because balanced messages contained pro- and con-issue arguments, we coded 
each thought as 1) supports pro-issue argument, 2) supports con-issue argument, 3) opposes 
pro-issue argument, or 4) opposes con-issue argument. Finally, we used the coded data for 
balanced, pro- and counter-attitudinal messages, to compute two indexes of disconfirmation 
bias for the entire sample: bolstering thoughts about pro-attitudinal arguments (Mrefugees = 
4.26, SD = 4.65; Mclimate change = 3.42, SD = 4.18) and denigrating thoughts about counter-
attitudinal arguments (Mrefugees = 2.73, SD = 4.05; Mclimate change = 2.53, SD = 3.86). 
6.7.4. Polarization 
Participants reported again their issue attitudes about climate change (M = 5.42, SD = 1.7) and 
refugees (M = 4.26, SD = 2.04) at the end of the experiment. Polarization is typically defined 
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and operationalized as the increasing extremity in individual issue attitudes (i.e., whether 
issue attitudes became more extreme in the posttest, relative to the pretest; see Levendusky, 
2013). Following this standard operationalization, we first determined the closest endpoint on 
the 7-point attitude scale. For example, if a participant´s pretest attitude score was between 1 
and 3, the closest endpoint was 1. For those with values of 5 and 7, the endpoint was 7. Second, 
we calculated the difference between pre- and post-test attitudes. Third, we estimated the 
direction and degree of polarization by looking at attitude change away or towards the closest 
scale endpoint. This resulted in an index in which a positive difference between pre- and 
post-test attitude scores indicated polarization, a negative difference depolarization, and zero 
for those participants who did not change their attitudes between the pretest and posttest 
measurements. 
6.8. Randomization check 
To ensure that random assignment to the motivation conditions (i.e., accuracy, defensive, 
control) was successful, we compared these groups on several measures of our baseline 
questionnaire. Randomization was successful; participants across motivation conditions did 
not differ significantly on climate change attitudes, F(2, 674) = 1.03, p = .36, attitudes towards 
refugees, F(2, 674) = 2.8, p = .06, age, F(2, 674) = .05, p = .95, gender, X2 ( 2, N = 677) = 3.65, p = .16, and 
education, X2 ( 14, N = 677) = 9.92, p = .77. 
6.9. Data Analysis 
We conducted several factorial ANOVAS with Tukey HSD test for post-hoc comparisons to 
examine Research Question 1 and Hypotheses 1 through 3. First, we examined the effects of 
message type (i.e., pro-, counter-attitudinal or balanced) on each of the information 
processing variables (i.e., argument strength, bolstering thoughts about pro-attitudinal 
arguments, and denigrating thoughts about counter-attitudinal arguments) (Research 
Question 1). Second, we estimated the interaction effects of message type and the three 
motivation conditions on information processing (Hypotheses 1 thru 2). Finally, we tested the 
extent to which message type and motivation predicted polarization (Hypotheses 3a, 3b). 
7. Results 
7.1. Effects of message type on attitude congruency and disconfirmation biases 
We start by answering Research Question 1, which examined how exposure to balanced 
messages affect biased information processing (attitude congruency and disconfirmation 
biases), compared to one-sided message exposure (see Table 1). Participants rated pro-
attitudinal messages as stronger than balanced and counter-attitudinal messages about 
climate change, F(3, 677) = 148.05, p < .001, ηp2 = .31, and refugees, F(3, 677) = 178.38, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.35. These results indicate that people exhibit attitude congruency bias when evaluating 
information: pro-attitudinal messages are perceived as having stronger arguments than those 
presented in balanced and counter-attitudinal messages. 
Next, we tested the impact of message type on disconfirmation bias (bolstering pro-
attitudinal arguments and denigrating counter-attitudinal arguments). We found that 
participants wrote down fewer thoughts that supported pro-attitudinal arguments about 
climate change, F(2, 674) = 326.39, p < .001, ηp2 = .49, and refugees, F(2, 674) = 354.72, p < .001, ηp2 
=.52, when the arguments were presented in balanced messages, compared to the number of 
supportive thoughts written in response to the arguments in pro-attitudinal messages. 
Second, participants were less likely to refute counter-attitudinal arguments about climate 
change, F(2, 674) = 340.47 p < .001, ηp2 = .51, and refugees, F(2, 674) = 354.72, p < .001, ηp2 =.52, when 
these were presented in balanced messages, compared to the same arguments presented in 
counter-attitudinal messages. Taken together, we found that a disconfirmation bias is weaker 
when people process balanced messages, compared to one-sided messages. Individuals are 
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less likely to think positively of pro-attitudinal arguments and less likely to refute counter-
attitudinal arguments when these are embedded in balanced messages. 
 
Table 1: Means and standard deviations of biased processing across message type 
exposure. 
Message type Attitude congruency bias   Disconfirmation bias   




















(SD = .99) 
5.75 
(SD = 1.0) 
7.13 
(SD = 4.45) 
8.38 




(SD = 1.17) 
4.39 
(SD = 1.08) 
3.13 
(SD = 2.63) 
4.48 
(SD = 3.38) 
1.21 
(SD = 1.63) 
1.38 




(SD = 1.44) 
3.47 
(SD = 1.68) 
- - 
6.21 
(SD = 4.39) 
6.74 
(SD = 4.57) 
Note. In each column, differences in mean scores among the three message types were all significant at 
p < .001. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
7.2. The moderating role of motivation on information processing 
The second goal of our study was to test whether people with different motivations process 
balanced information in similar or less biased ways, compared to one-sided messages. We 
start by testing hypothesis 1a, which stated that defensive motivated people would exhibit 
stronger attitude congruency bias by evaluating pro-attitudinal messages as stronger than 
balanced and counter-attitudinal messages. We then expected that accuracy driven 
individuals would show weaker attitude congruency bias by judging balanced messages as 
stronger than pro- and counter-attitudinal messages (hypothesis 1b). Both hypotheses were 
rejected according to our findings. 
The interaction effect of motivation and message type on how strongly participants 
perceived different messages was non-significant for both issues (refugees F(4, 668) = 1.73, p = 
.14; climate change F(4, 668) = 1.91, p = .11), indicating that motivation did not moderate the effect 
of message exposure on attitude congruency bias. Instead, accuracy and defensive motivated 
participants and those in the control group exhibited similar levels of attitude congruency 
bias –in all three groups, pro-attitudinal messages were evaluated as stronger than balanced 
and counter-attitudinal messages (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Average scores of the argument strength of message types across 
motivation groups. 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Next, we tested hypothesis 2a, which posited that defensive motivated people would exhibit 
stronger disconfirmation bias (bolstering pro-attitudinal arguments and refuting counter-
attitudinal arguments), such that they would be equally likely to bolster pro-attitudinal 
arguments and denigrate counter-attitudinal arguments in one-sided messages, as in 
balanced messages. And we tested hypothesis 2b, according to which accuracy motivated 
people would show a weaker disconfirmation bias, such that they would be less likely to 
bolster pro-attitudinal arguments and to denigrate counter-attitudinal arguments in 
balanced messages, compared to one-sided messages. 
Our results reject hypothesis 2a. Motivation did not moderate the effect of message type 
on bolstering thoughts about pro-attitudinal arguments (refugees F(4, 668) = .90, p = .47; climate 
change F(4, 668) = 1.28, p = .28). Instead, the number of bolstering thoughts in response to pro-
attitudinal and balanced messages did not differ between individuals motivated by accuracy 
and those driven by a defensive motivation (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Average number of bolstering thoughts about pro-attitudinal arguments 
across motivation groups. 
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Hypothesis 2b was mostly rejected. For the refuges issue, the relation between message type 
and refuting counter-attitudinal arguments was not moderated by motivation, F(4, 668) = .1.22, 
p = .30. On climate change, accuracy motivated participants refuted counter-attitudinal 
messages less (M = 5.0; SD = 3.64), than defensive motivated participants (M = 6.64; SD = 4.29) 
and those in the control group (M = 7.01; SD = 4.84, p < .001), F(4, 668) = 4.60, p < .01, ηp2 = .03 
(see Figure 3). 
Figure 3: Average number of denigrating thoughts about counter-attitudinal 
arguments across motivation groups. 
 
In sum, the results indicate that attitude congruency bias emerges similarly across defensive 
and accuracy motivated people, as both groups judged pro-attitudinal messages as stronger 
than balanced and counter-attitudinal. Furthermore, both motivation groups showed a 
weaker disconfirmation bias in response to balanced messages, relative to one-sided ones. 
Given the similarities in the processing of different political messages between individuals 
driven by defensive and accuracy motivations, hypotheses 1 thru 2 were not supported. 
7.3. Effects of message exposure on polarization 
The last objective of this project was to examine attitude polarization as a result of exposure 
to balanced versus one-sided messages, and also test whether the potential resulting 
polarization varies with individual motivations (hypotheses 3a, 3b). 
We do find a significant effect of message type on polarization for climate change, F(2, 674) 
= 3.34, p < .05, ηp2 = .01, and a marginally significant effect for refugees, F(2, 674) = 2.59, p = .07, 
ηp2 = .01. On climate change, participants polarized less in response to balanced exposure (M 
= -.62, SD = 1.42), compared to pro-attitudinal exposure (M = -.31, SD = 1.20, p < .05). However, 
the results for the refugees issue differ. Not balanced, but counter-attitudinal messages (M = 
-.84, SD = 1.63) lead to lower polarization relative to pro-attitudinal exposure (M = -.56, SD = 
1.71, p < .05). 
Next, we tested hypotheses 3a and 3b, according to which defensive motivated people 
would be equally likely to polarize in reaction to balanced messages, compared to one-sided 
messages (H3a); whereas people motivated by accuracy would be less likely to polarize in 
reaction to balanced or counter-attitudinal messages, compared to pro-attitudinal messages 
(H3b). The interaction effect of motivation and message type on polarization was non-
significant for climate change, F(4, 668) = 1.50, p = .20, and refugees, F(4, 668) = 1.60, p = .17. Thus, 
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7.3.1. Additional analyses on polarization 
We conducted a multivariate regression analysis to test whether biased information 
processing and individual motivations predicted attitude polarization. The first model 
included as predictors the three biased processing variables (attitude congruency bias, 
bolstering thoughts about pro-attitudinal arguments and denigrating thoughts about 
counter-attitudinal arguments) and individual motivation (accuracy, defensive and the 
control group as the reference category). The second model included interaction terms 
between the three biased processing variables and our motivation groups. 
Overall, the results showed little evidence that attitude polarization was influenced by 
biased information processing and individual motivations. The first model found that an 
attitude congruency bias lead to more extreme attitudes, but this effect was small and only 
for climate change (b = .10, p < .05). Furthermore, results for both issues showed that the two 
disconfirmation bias variables had null effects on polarization. Looking at the second model, 
motivation did not moderate the relationship between the three biased processing variables 
and polarization. 
Because these null results contradict previous research (e.g., Taber & Lodge, 2006), we 
tested several different regression models to guard against the possibility that our results are 
due to the way we operationalized polarization. Around 25% of our sample reported extreme 
attitudes in the pretest, i.e., at the very end of the attitude scales. It is difficult to detect 
polarization among these extreme cases because attitude change is constricted by the upper 
and lower bounds of the scale and regression to the mean (see Taber & Lodge, 2006). 
Therefore, we retested the multivariate regression models without the extreme cases. 
Furthermore, we also conducted a logistic regression to test the effects of processing and 
its interaction with motivation on attitude polarization, using the less nuanced, but more 
powerful, binary polarization index, which assigns a value of 1 to those who –at the posttest– 
reported an attitude that was more extreme than their pretest attitude as well as to those at 
the extremes of the scales, and value 0 to those who did not change their attitudes or 
depolarized (see Wojcieszak, 2011). Using a multinomial logistic regression, we also tested a 
trinary polarization index, which assigns value -1 to those who depolarized, value 0 to those 
who did not move their attitudes, including those at the extreme ends of the scales, and value 
1 to those who moved toward their initial attitude. 
In all these cases, we find consistently that attitude polarization was not predicted by 
information processing or its interaction with motivation. Testing our predictions across 
these different models and operationalizations assures that the way we measured polarization 
is not responsible for these effects. 
8. Discussion 
In this article, we examined how people process balanced and one-sided messages about two 
contested sociopolitical issues, climate change and Syrian refugees. In addition, we tested 
whether information processing differs between people motivated to defend their existing 
opinions versus those motivated to reach an accurate conclusion. Finally, we studied how 
exposure to one-sided and balanced messages influences attitudinal polarization, and 
whether such outcomes varied across people with different motivations. 
Our first finding concerns the processing of balanced messages, relative to one-sided 
messages. We found that the extent to which people rely on attitude congruency and 
disconfirmation biases to process information depends on the type of information they 
encounter. For one, consistent with most prior research (e.g., Gunther, 2017), we show that 
people perceive pro-attitudinal messages as stronger than balanced and counter-attitudinal 
messages. In other words, individuals exhibit attitude congruency bias. In contrast, our 
findings on disconfirmation bias show that balanced exposure forces people to think about 
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conflicting political perspectives in a more even-handed way. Thus, compared to one-sided 
messages, individuals rely less on a disconfirmation bias to interpret balanced information. 
Our second key finding regards how individual motivations affect the processing of 
balanced and one-sided messages. In line with motivated reasoning theory (Kunda, 1990) and 
extant research on the processing of one-sided messages (e.g., Bolsen, Druckman & Cook, 
2014), we found that people in search of accurate conclusions about climate change are more 
open-minded towards counter-attitudinal messages, whereas individuals driven by a 
defensive motivation and those assigned to the control group are more likely to use their 
cognitive resources to refute this type of messages. 
Most notably we find that both people driven by defensive and accuracy motivations 
evaluate and think about balanced messages in the same way. To explain these similar 
processing patterns, we can draw on motivated reasoning theory, and speculate that exposure 
to balanced messages imposes reality constrains that limit the influence of defensive and 
accuracy motivations on information processing (see Chaiken et al., 1996; Kunda, 1990). 
Typically, defensive motivated individuals rely on biased processing mechanisms to justify 
their desired conclusions. However, the extent to which these individuals are capable of being 
biased is limited by their need to also appear objective, a limit that could be triggered by 
exposure to balanced information. In contrast, accuracy motivated individuals desire to reach 
correct conclusions, but they may fall short of this goal if pro-attitudinal views in balanced 
messages reminds them of their prior opinions, which in turn limits their capacity to be 
unbiased. 
Our third set of findings regards attitude polarization. Consistent with prior work (e.g., 
Arceneaux & Johnson, 2015), we find that people exposed to pro-attitudinal messages 
polarized more than those presented with balanced information about climate change or 
counter-attitudinal content about refugees. Mostly importantly, our findings indicate that 
exposure to balanced content prevents people’s attitudes from becoming more extreme (e.g., 
Levendusky, 2013). However, we do not find a depolarizing effect of balanced messages, which 
contradicts the argument of some scholars that exposure to counter-attitudinal arguments, 
be it in one-sided (Garret et al., 2014) or balanced messages (Matthes & Valenzuela, 2012), can 
counter political polarization. 
Our results also show that motivation did not moderate the effects of balanced exposure 
on attitude polarization. This may be because we looked for evidence on a wrong outcome 
variable. Some work suggests that message exposure among motivated reasoners does not 
lead to attitude change, but instead to increased certainty in prior opinions (see Leeper, 2014). 
Other work indicates that exposure to two-sided messages increases attitude certainty more 
that one-sided messages (Rucker, Petty & Briñol, 2008). Therefore, it is plausible that we 
would have detected some differences between the conditions had we tested attitude 
certainty or importance as an outcome of message exposure and information processing. 
Alternatively, our treatments of motivated reasoning may have made participants aware of 
their initial attitudes, and as a result, made the participants more committed to these attitudes 
and increased their resistance to persuasion. Perhaps, had we used an implicit measure of 
issue attitudes, or had we used a stronger measurement consisting of multiple items, we 
would have observed more attitude change. 
Finally, we did not find evidence to support the notion that biased processing and 
motivations explain the effects of exposure on attitude polarization. This consistent pattern 
of null effects emerged across different models (e.g., with and without extreme attitude cases) 
and using several different ways of computing attitude polarization, for example, whether a 
difference score or a binary or trinary index. These null effects were also parallel for the two 
very distinct sociopolitical issues tested, indicating that it is not the case that biased 
processing and one’s motivation fail to polarize attitudes on some issues (e.g., the more 
complex scientific ones like the climate change) but lead to strong polarizing effects on others 
Brenes Peralta, C., Wojcieszak, M. & Lelkes, Y. 
Can I Stick to My Guns? Motivated Reasoning and Biased Processing of Balanced Political Information 
ISSN 2386-7876 – © 2021 Communication & Society, 34(2), 49-66 
63
(e.g., more value laden and hot-button issues, such as the refugees). It may be the case that 
information processing does not lead to polarization, and instead, future research should 
systematically test other mechanisms that can better explain the relationship between 
exposure and polarization. However, before accepting such an overarching and arguably 
controversial conclusion, other studies should replicate our findings with different 
convenience or representative samples, on different issues, and with different polarization 
measures (see Wojcieszak, 2011). 
Relatedly, another limitation of our study is that our reliance on the Mechanical Turk 
sample restricts the generalizability of our findings. That said, in comparison with other 
convenience samples, MTurk samples are demographically more representative and diverse 
(e.g., Berinsky, Huber & Lenz, 2012). Furthermore, compared to nationally representative 
samples, the same results on identical studies have been found with MTurk samples (Mullinix, 
Leeper, Druckman & Freese, 2015). Also, because our project aimed to pinpoint specific 
psychological mechanisms and causal effects, instead of making population estimates, the 
lack of a generalizable sample is not crucial. 
Aside from these limitations, our findings suggest several avenues for future research. 
For example, the stimulus material we designed presented statistical evidence to argue a 
certain position. However, most news stories also contain other forms of evidence, such as 
personal stories. Research finds that exposure to such stories makes people more receptive 
to and less likely to argue against counter-attitudinal arguments (e.g., Wojcieszak & Kim, 
2016). It is thus possible that the observed processing patterns do not generalize to other types 
of messages available in the media. Future studies should test whether different 
characteristics of political content, such as types of evidence or visuals moderate the 
processing and the effects of balanced exposure. 
In addition, we encourage scholars to explore whether the effects would be different with 
news stories that additionally contained some partisanship cues. We focused on the 
perspective through which a news story described the two political issues, whether 
supportive or oppositional. This approach aligns with some prior work (e.g., Knobloch-
Westerwick & Meng, 2009) and is more suitable for multi-party systems, in which certain 
issues are not “owned” by one specific party, or for media systems, in which certain media 
outlets are not automatically categorized as being from the left or the right. However, in the 
U.S. context, which we studied, including mentions of political parties or logos of new media 
organizations might have strengthened motivated reasoning (see Druckman, 2012) and 
affected processing patterns, for example, by increasing the likelihood that defensive 
motivated people would be more biased in response to balanced information. 
As another suggestion for future research, we focused on the often studied defensive and 
accuracy goals, finding that they did not shape the processing of balanced messages. However, 
we did not study the influence of other motivations, such as impression motivation, which 
can be important given that online news contain diverse social cues that can be used by 
audiences to inform or endorse their own interpretations about a message (see Winter et al., 
2016). Because our messages did not contain any social cues, this motivation was less relevant 
for our purposes. Yet future research should design experiments that test how impression 
motivation interacts with balanced exposure in general, and especially in the context of news 
exposure on social media. 
What implications do our findings have for research on information processing, 
motivated reasoning, and attitude polarization? First, our results support the argument that 
people are biased reasoners when interpreting political information. But we also offer an 
important caveat to this argument, showing that individual reasoning is also shaped by the 
information environment, and that balanced messages can promote more even-handed 
processing (e.g., weaker disconfirmation bias). Second, we show that individuals with 
different motivations respond to balanced political messages in the same way, which matters 
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because exposure to balanced information promotes more even-handed thinking –even 
among those who typically rely on cognitive biases to protect and reinforce their attitudes 
towards contested political issues. 
Third, although exposure to balanced political views may not promote more moderate 
views, it prevents an increase in attitude polarization among different groups of citizens, 
compared to exposure to pro-attitudinal information. This is an important outcome of this 
study because polarization can cause individuals to develop different conceptions of reality 
and factual truth (Manjoo, 2008), be less tolerant to opposing political views (Sunstein, 2009), 
and be more willing to abandon democratic principles for partisan interests (Svolik, 2019). 
Therefore, countering political polarization is crucial to protect and preserve democratic 
systems. 
Our findings reinforce the argument that political communication research should 
expand their traditional focus on studying exposure to one-sided messages, and devote more 
attention to balanced exposure, which is not only present in the current media environment, 
but also valued by many citizens (see, e.g., Wojcieszak et al., 2020). 
Balanced political information has important value in democratic systems. It encourages 
citizens to be more open-minded about divisive political issues of the day and has the power 
to do so even among individuals motivated to protect their prior opinions. Because of this, 
balanced news coverage can help citizens develop better-informed opinions, which is 
ultimately indispensable for the proper functioning of any democracy. 
 
We wish to acknowledge the great support of Prof. Dr. Claes de Vreese (University of Amsterdam) 
in all the stages of this original research. 
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